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Much of the discussion about the legal relationship between athletes and anti-doping regimes has 
focussed on the application of what is invariably, although somewhat loosely, referred to as the 
‘strict liability principle’, and this paper is concerned with the application of this principle in the 
context of nutritional supplement use (for more general discussion of its application see Charlish, 
2012; Anderson, 2013). The principle’s significance lie in the fact that domestic courts worldwide 
(for example those of England and Wales in Korda v ITF, The Times 4 February 1999), the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] 5 CMLR 18) and the Court 
of Arbitration for Sport (USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir CAS 94/129) 
have accepted that the relationship between an athlete and the governing body is contractual and 
that even if there is no written agreement between the parties, the existence of that contract can be 
discerned from the parties’ dealings with one another. As part of this contractual relationship, 
athletes are deemed to have accepted the provisions of the WADA Code, both in terms of the 
substantive provisions of what substances are banned and the sanctions that can be imposed for 
violation of the rules. The procedural provisions that deal with the conduct of anti-doping tribunals 
and the potential right of appeal to the CAS are also incorporated into this contract.
It is this contractual relationship which binds the athletes to the strict liability principle, for it 
is a fundamental tenet of the WADA Code and likewise forms part of the contract that athletes are 
deemed to ‘sign’ when they participate in a competition that is amenable to a WADA-mandated 
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testing regime. The strict liability principle means the athlete is responsible for any prohibited 
substance which is found in their sample and regardless of whether the athlete intentionally, 
carelessly or recklessly consumed that substance. Consequently, it is not necessary for the anti-
doping authorities to establish any fault on the part of the athlete before an anti-doping violation can 
be deemed to have occurred: the mere fact that the substance is present in the athlete’s sample is 
enough to attract a sanction.  
While accepting that in all likelihood very severe sanctions will be imposed upon athletes 
who are not at fault for their anti-doping violation, both the CAS and the domestic courts have 
upheld the application of strict liability. In USA Shooting and Quigley the CAS did so on the ground 
that: 
 
It is likely that even intentional abuse would in many cases escape sanction for lack of 
proof of guilty intent. And it is certain that a requirement of intent would invite costly 
litigation that may well cripple federations – particularly those run on modest budgets – 
in their fight against doping….The high objectives and practical necessities of the fight 
against doping amply justify the application of a strict liability standard  
(paras 15, 16). 
 
However, the potential unfairness to athletes that strict liability creates has been recognised in the 
field of anti-doping, and in consequence the principle has been significantly modified, to such an 
extent that it is no longer appropriate to speak of strict liability in the true sense. The WADA Code 
now provides that with both ‘prohibited’ substances and ‘specified’ substances, it is possible for 
athletes to avoid the full implications of strict liability and reduce what would normally be a 
mandatory sanction if strict liability principles were invoked. In respect of prohibited substances, 
the full implications can be avoided if the athlete can first show, on the balance of probabilities, 
how the prohibited substance entered their system and can then go on to establish, to the 
comfortable satisfaction of the anti-doping panel, that they bore either i) no fault or negligence or ii) 
no significant fault or negligence for its presence. ‘No fault’ leads to the sanction being entirely 
eliminated, while ‘no significant fault’ leads to a considerable reduction but not its complete 
removal. With respect to specified substances, which are characterised as those where there might 
be a credible non-doping explanation for the substance’s presence, the period of ineligibility can be 
reduced or eliminated if the athlete can establish to the doping panel’s comfortable satisfaction i) 
how the substance got into their system, and ii) that there was no attempt to improve their sporting 
performance. Prohibited substances include steroids and human growth hormone, and because there 
is no credible non-doping explanation for their presence they cannot be ‘specified’.  
The purpose of this paper is to show that, notwithstanding this ‘modified’ strict liability 
principle, the categorisation as ‘prohibited’ of certain substances that nutritional supplements may 
contain, and the way in which supplement-related violations have been dealt with by national anti-
doping agencies and by the CAS, mean that even this ‘modified’ approach offers very little comfort 
to athletes who test positive as a consequence of using them. Almost every anti-doping violation at 
the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics was ascribed to nutritional supplement use, supplement-related 
cases frequently arise before the CAS and domestic anti-doping tribunals and the degree of 
publicity that is now given to the risks associated with them means an athlete who chooses to use 
one and then commits an anti-doping violation (either because the athlete failed to ascertain the 
contents, or because the product had become contaminated during the production process) is not 
able to use lack of knowledge or absence of intent as a particularly strong defence. As a broad rule 
of thumb, an anti-doping violation inadvertently committed through use of a nutritional supplement 
is currently likely to attract a sanction of between fifteen and eighteen months’ ineligibility, 
assuming the panel accepts that the athlete had no intention to cheat by using the product they did.  
 
Nutritional supplements, random tests and the unavoidable risk 
Prior to April 2009, the United Kingdom’s Special Commissioners of Income Tax were responsible 
for hearing appeals against decisions taken by the UK Inland Revenue Service relating to people’s 
taxation assessments. Pursuant to those powers, in February 2008 they handed down their judgment 
in Emms v HMRC [2008] WL 371110, which was an appeal in respect of the tax liabilities of a 
professional rugby union player and, specifically, whether he could offset the cost of his nutritional 
supplements against the tax monies he owed.   
The tax payer in question, Simon Emms, was a rugby union prop forward, who played for 
Lanelli and later for Bath (historically, two of the strongest teams in the domestic game). Rather 
like that of a Special Commissioner of Taxation, his was a highly specialist position that would be 
beyond the skills of most ordinary people. The role of prop forward demands considerable weight 
and physical strength and requires its practitioners to undergo specialist training in order to cope 
with the unique risks and the physical demands of the position – particularly the risk of neck and 
spinal injuries which may occur as a result of collapsing scrums. Players who are not trained and are 
thus ‘unqualified’ as props are unable to play in that position and, at all levels of the game, this can 
result in referees ordering uncontested scrums and clubs forfeiting matches if they don’t have 
enough players with the necessary skills and strength. Given the importance of his role in the team, 
it was not at all unusual that, while at Llanelli, Emms had been under a contractual obligation to 
‘undertake such training, whether on an individual basis or during club training sessions to achieve 
and maintain the fitness levels reasonably and properly required from time to time by the (club) 
fitness adviser.’ Players who did not meet the fitness criteria were fined and subjected to a fitness 
improvement programme. At Bath, his employment contract had gone a stage further: it contained a 
similar term, with the added proviso that the club could treat a player’s ‘failure to maintain the high 
standard of physical fitness’ as an act of gross misconduct justifying instant dismissal.  
The training regime and diet that Emms had agreed with his coaches required him to consume 
4500 protein-laden calories a day, which is about 50% more than the recommended intake for a 
moderately-active man in his twenties. He was unable to reach those levels through his ‘normal’ 
food intake of three large meals a day and several daily snack breaks. Consequently he enhanced his 
diet through daily consumption of a nutritional supplement which contained the protein equivalent 
of two chicken breasts, and various multi-vitamins in addition. A dispute arose when his self-
assessed tax returns for a three-year period asserted that the costs incurred for the purchase of 
additional foods and his nutritional supplements (totalling between £2500 and £3900 a year) were 
deductible from his earned income and were thus not liable for income tax. The tax authorities 
contended that the expenditure did not qualify as a deduction from earnings because it was not 
incurred ‘exclusively and necessarily’ in the performance of his employment duties as required 
under the Income Tax Act 1988, s. 198 and rejected his submission. Emms appealed to the Special 
Commissioners, but his appeal was unsuccessful. 
In the course of that appeal, Emms had argued (at para 22) that ‘all professional rugby union 
prop forwards incur expenditure on additional food, nutritional supplements and medicines to 
achieve the required level of fitness.’ Although the Commissioners rejected his appeal, agreeing 
with the assessors that their use was not ‘exclusive and necessary’ in the way that (for example) 
work tools or safety equipment might be, his case and the earlier one of Ansell v Brown [2001] WL 
535716 (which contained very similar issues of fact and law) help us explore the twin concepts of 
‘intent’ and ‘risk’ in the context of the use of nutritional supplements. In neither Emms nor Ansell 
had the employer club explicitly required the player to use nutritional supplements as a term of the 
employment contract, but the existence of a contractual term purportedly giving the employer the 
right to dismiss those who didn’t reach agreed targets of weight and fitness indicates that, while in 
no way being encouraged to use prohibited substances, players were expected to use whatever 
means were necessary to get to where they needed to be; and, if not expressly then by implication, 
that would include using supplements. Their use has long been an accepted necessity in collision 
sports like both codes of rugby or American football, and even in disciplines where muscle bulk is 
not a pre-requisite their consumption appears to be an integral part of many participants’ dietary 
regimes. The rapid rise in the number of supplement-related cases at the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport (CAS) is testimony to this, as is the fact that at the Sochi 2014 Olympics all but one of the 
reported positive tests apparently arose from supplement use (Alcolizer, 2014). Like Emms’, those 
cases indicate that their use is not merely accepted, but an implicitly expected, aspect of the elite 
athlete’s career obligations. 
The testing authorities at Sochi invoked the mantra that anti-doping work is increasingly 
‘intelligence-led’ rather than being an entirely random process; but Emms’ case and the myriad 
supplement cases to be heard by CAS and domestic anti-doping tribunals in recent years show it 
does not take a great deal of ‘intelligence’ to work out that elite athletes are likely to use them. It is 
hard to envisage a softer target for an intelligence-led anti-doping agency than the publicly-
available transcripts of a court judgment in which an elite athlete has acknowledged that those in his 
sphere of employment are regular and heavy users of nutritional supplements. Professional prop 
forwards use them in order to meet their contractual obligation, and employers certainly do not 
condemn their use. Thanks to the anti-doping courses they attend, athletes will have been made 
aware of the possibility of supplement contamination and the risk of violating their sport’s anti-
doping strictures as a consequence; but they use them with the intention of enhancing their 
performance, whether to meet the explicit obligations of an employment contract or to make them 
more competitive on the field of play for the benefit of themselves and their team. Athletes who use 
supplements – like those who drink water, use painkillers or have diets created for them by a 
nutritionist – do so with the intention of enhancing their performance. 
In Ansell, counsel for the player had said that the hearing was ‘a test case for those rugby 
players who incur expenditure on supplements which are necessary for them to achieve the fitness, 
size and physique required of the top-class players’. Given the current state of knowledge about the 
risks of supplement contamination and the provisions of the WADA Code, it is hard to believe that 
players now would be quite so open about their supplement use. And while it would be unwise to 
read too much into a handful of positive tests, the results from Sochi 2014 and the supplement-
related decisions emanating from the CAS certainly do not indicate that their use by elite athletes is 
declining. The sheer volume of supplements freely available and the number of their potential 
contents on the WADA banned list likewise continues to increase. In the 2010 Commonwealth 
Games, Damola Osayemi (who won the women’s 100m hurdles) and another Nigerian sprinter, 
Samuel Okon, tested positive for methylhexaneamine, which had been added to the WADA banned 
list in 2009 (it was reclassified at the beginning of 2011 so that it could be used with a therapeutic 
use exemption certificate), but it has recently started appearing in nutritional supplements and is 
alternatively marketed as MHA, DMAA, Geranamine and Forthan. Two weeks after the Nigerians’ 
suspension it was reported that nine Australian athletes (including Commonwealth Games 
participants, rugby league players and Australian Rules footballers) had tested positive for the same 
substance (BBC, 2011). Over the following three years there were myriad other cases of positive 
tests for MHA being ascribed to nutritional supplement use, including three of those athletes who 
tested positive at the 2014 Winter Olympics (BBC, 2014).  
The volume of cases of inadvertent doping through nutritional supplement use confirm that 
the risk associated with those products is genuine, and while Emms’ case is of little moment to 
anyone other than UK tax lawyers now, it does show that athletes’ use of supplements can be 
attributable to genuine workplace demands just as much as it can result from advice offered by 
other athletes or coaches, or from a unilateral decision on the part of the athlete. Whatever its 
background, every new case of supplement contamination renders increasingly untenable other 
athletes’ contention that they did not know of the dangers; in WADA parlance, you were either 
aware of the risks or you should have been. The small number of supplement-related positive tests 
that have emerged from both codes of rugby is either a testament to the testing authorities’ not 
pursuing such soft targets or is evidence that supplement contamination is not as widespread as 
many commentators and anti-doping educators fear. But even if the latter applies and the statistical 
risks can be overstated, Sochi 2014 shows that the ramifications of testing positive as a consequence 
of using contaminated supplements are grave. Perhaps the risks are statistically small, but if 
virtually every athlete in a particular discipline is using them, an unknowably small percentage will 
be consuming contaminated ones and, eventually, positive tests will occur. There is no such thing as 
a ‘guaranteed safe’ nutritional supplement. And there is no refuge to be found in the WADA Code, 
which has been drafted – and increasingly interpreted by the CAS and other doping tribunals – in a 
way that now makes it impossible for those who use contaminated supplements to avoid a very 
significant suspension because of the ‘no fault’ and ‘no significant fault’ provisions. If you use a 
nutritional supplement your ‘intent’ is to enhance your performance, and you either know – or can 
be reasonably expected to know – that there are ‘risks’ in doing so. 
 
The ‘risks’ with nutritional supplements 
In 2006, the nutritional supplement industry was said to be worth over $60 billion worldwide, and 
there is credible research suggesting that in some sporting disciplines their use is ubiquitous (while 
there are no figures to substantiate the point, it is not at all fanciful to suppose that 100% of 
professional and elite amateur rugby union prop forwards use them). While some products indicate 
on their labels that they contain banned substances, anything that ‘promotes muscle growth’ should 
clearly be avoided, as should virtually everything ending in ‘ine’ others – including those freely 
available online or in high street supermarkets, sports goods shops, ‘health food’ stores and leisure 
centres – make no mention of the potential presence either of relatively well-known proscribed 
substances or of more obscure contaminants that are also banned. While a manufacturer can be 
expected to comply with domestic legal requirements on product labelling and content as best they 
can, it would be  dangerous for them to definitively declare the absence of banned substances 
because they cannot say with certainty that their product has avoided any risk of contamination at 
the manufacturing stage. No sensible, professionally-advised, supplement manufacturer would ever 
advertise their product as ‘Guaranteed WADA Compliant’, not least because taking the steps 
necessary to guarantee its compliance would price the product out of the market - assuming it were 
even possible to do so.  
The prohibited substances which can contaminate supplements but which might not appear on 
labels include ‘prohormones’ – special anabolic androgenic steroids – which are prohibited both in- 
and out-of-competition under the WADA Code but which can  find their way into supplements 
during the manufacturing process without anyone knowing. This category includes the prohormones 
of nandrolone (norandrostenedione) and testosterone, and since these are not ‘specified substances’ 
for the purposes of the WADA Code it is not open to an athlete to argue that there is a credible 
explanation for their positive test and that there was no performance-enhancing intent (WADA, 
2009). Further, because some banned substances are not capable of being produced endogenously 
(i.e., the body cannot produce them naturally) there is no minimum ‘threshold’ as there is for those 
substances which the body does produce, such as nandrolone itself.  Nandrolone is particularly 
notorious because there is credible evidence that one can test positive for it without having ingested 
or injected it with a performance-enhancing intent (Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] 5 CMLR 
18), in 1996 the IOC introduced a minimum ‘threshold’ below which the presence of nandrolone 
does not constitute a doping offence (Kohler and Lambert, 2002). But deliberately or inadvertently 
ingesting nandrolone can yield a positive test – i.e., a result above the IOC threshold - up to ten days 
after ingestion (Geyer, 2008).  
In the absence of evidence that they had been sabotaged by a rival competitor (the burden of 
proof in that respect being on the athlete), those who test positive (including positive test for 
substances where levels are above any permitted threshold) can only hope to reduce the sanction by 
showing there was ‘no significant fault’ on their part rather than arguing ‘no fault’ on the ground 
that the substance had somehow manifested itself ‘naturally’. But the CAS awards confirm that 
because the risks of hormone and prohormone contamination of supplements are now so well-
established and so well communicated to the athletes, they are probably always going to be deemed 
‘significantly at fault’ if they choose to run the risks inherently associated with supplement use. If 
they implicitly or explicitly felt compelled to use them in order to meet the terms of an employment 
relationship, and if they were using them under the direct supervision and instruction of a team 
physician, then perhaps an employed athlete could hope to establish they were not ‘at fault’ or 
‘significantly at fault’, and this appears to be a potential issue with a doping dispute involving 
Australian Football League (‘Aussie Rules’) club Essendon at the time of writing (Warner, 2014). 
But this would not apply in respect of a coach or physician who has been directly contracted by the 
athlete (the physician of a tennis player or a golfer for example), because in those circumstances the 
athletes would be deemed responsible for the actions of those they have allowed into their ‘inner 
circle’.  
The concerns here do not arise from systematic, deliberate attempts on the part of 
unscrupulous manufacturers to mislead their customers, but from inadvertent contamination at the 
production stage or the failure of athletes to read and understand what it says on the packaging. 
While, even in the absence of spurious claims as to WADA compliance, it might still be possible to 
argue that manufacturers have been negligent and breached the duty of care they owe to their 
customers or are otherwise liable under domestic product liability or labelling laws, no pecuniary 
remedy could ever compensate for the time away from competition and the career taint which 
inevitably follows a doping sanction. The concern is not one that can be obviated by scrupulous 
adherence to domestic food labelling regimes by the brand owners; it is of those involved in the 
manufacturing process either making other products using the same equipment without proper 
cleansing in between, or of the raw materials being adulterated, perhaps deliberately, by those who 
are involved still earlier in the preparation or transportation stages. The consumption of nutritional 
supplements thus contaminated is as capable of leading to a positive test (Geyer et al, 2004) as are 
situations where athletes either wilfully ignore what is stated on the label or simply do not take 
sufficient steps to establish that the name which is used on that label is another name for a product 
which is banned. For example, the WADA Code does not mention ‘geranium’, which is just a user-
friendly name for methylhexaneamine, and ingestion of a product carrying the former name is far 
more likely to occur than is reckless consumption of a product explicitly noted as containing the 
latter, or the product not being mentioned at all due to a deliberate subterfuge either by the company 
whose name appears on the label or by those otherwise involved in its manufacture. Further, the 
risks of athlete ignorance are not confined to athletes based in countries with a comparatively less 
robust regime of manufacturing standards and neither is there evidence that they hail from countries 
or disciplines with a less rigorous anti-doping regime. Similarly, there is no evidence that the risks 
are particularly acute with products purchased over the internet and which may be expected to have 
a particularly dubious provenance; substances purchased from ‘reputable’ manufacturers and outlets 
have far more frequently been the source of doping violations. Being located in a jurisdiction which 
has a comparatively extensive regulatory framework does not provide an athlete with any reason to 
believe that their chosen supplement will be WADA compliant; food safety law is not at all 
concerned with the strictures of the WADA Code, and compliance with the former should not lead 
to any sense of security in respect of the latter.  
By way of example, in the United States the Dietary Supplement Health and Education Act 
1994 legalised the over-the-counter and internet sale of various androgenic steroids which are now 
prohibited or restricted under the WADA Code. In effect, the Act allowed steroids to be marketed 
as nutritional supplements so long as they did not claim to detect, prevent, or cure disease, and so 
long as those restrictions were adhered to they would escape the US food and drug Regulations 
which applied to those substances which supposedly had medicinal properties. Although the 
perceived regulatory gap which ostensibly made the purchase of steroids too easy was subsequently 
filled by the Anabolic Steroid Act 2004 (there are similar provisions in many other jurisdictions), 
several studies into the continued mislabelling of nutritional supplement products had been carried 
out prior to that legislation coming into force. Those studies indicated that, whether by accident or 
design, manufacturers often failed to mention that their products contained steroids, declared them 
under unapproved names, or inaccurately indicated the concentrations of those products (Green et 
al., 2001). Despite the new regulatory frameworks which have emerged in the US and other 
jurisdictions over the past decade, there is still a clear potential for athletes to fail WADA-mandated 
tests because of contaminated nutritional or weight-loss supplements (Young, 2014) or their own 
failures to carry out appropriate checks. While mislabelling/no-labelling may amount to a violation 
of domestic laws and might provide a civil remedy of sorts for an athlete who fails a test as a 
consequence of using them (perhaps in the form of damages or compensation for loss of product 
endorsement or other revenue), any such remedy will provide limited comfort. 
Much of the relevant scientific research is rather dated now, but it appears that difficulties 
continue to arise notwithstanding the application of legislative frameworks to the supplement 
industry. And while there is a perception of particular problems with products manufactured in 
China, Cyprus and other jurisdictions with a comparatively limited regulatory framework – and 
which are, of course, freely available to purchase over the internet – the problems have never been 
exclusive to those jurisdictions where there is less regulation of the manufacturing and sales 
processes (Geyer, et al, 2004; 2008). Van der Merwe and Grobbelaar (2005) indicated that 7% of 
products then available in South Africa were either mislabelled or contaminated with prohibited 
substances, while in 2001 an IOC study of 634 nutritional supplements available in 13 countries 
suggested 15% contained prohormones which were not listed on the product label. Perhaps more 
extensive domestic regulation and a wider understanding of the risks will result in fewer positive 
tests, but athletes who fail tests as a consequence of using nutritional supplements do not inevitably 
come from those countries where there is a less rigorous internal regulatory regime. 
  
Nutritional supplements and the WADA Code: the impossibility of exoneration 
While there may be potential, if rather limited, remedies available under domestic laws, athletes 
who test positive as a consequence of nutritional supplement use will be far more interested in what 
Article 10.4 and 10.5 of the WADA Code have to offer. The former provides that where an athlete 
can show how a ‘specified substance’ entered their body and can show there was no intent to either 
enhance their performance or to mask the use of a performance-enhancing substance, their sanction 
can be reduced to whatever level the tribunal considers appropriate. A ‘specified substance’ is not 
one which is deemed ‘less serious’ by definition; rather, it is one where there is the possibility that a 
credible non-doping explanation for its presence can be proffered. If the tribunal does not accept the 
explanation, the four-year sanction for which the 2015 Code makes provision will normally apply.   
Article 10.5 provides that an athlete can be entirely exonerated if they can show there was ‘no 
fault or negligence’ on their part or, alternatively, they can elicit a reduction to no less than one-half 
of the sanction that would otherwise be applicable if they can show ‘no significant fault or 
negligence’; put another way, an athlete who falls into the latter of the Article 10.5 categories is still 
destined to serve a ban of at least two years. Only a finding of ‘no fault or negligence’ carries the 
possibility of an athlete resuming their career without any penalty at all. The difficulty of securing 
this particular Holy Grail is explored in WADA v West below, which indicates that it might only be 
achievable if one can show (for instance) sabotage by a rival. Sabotage by a coach, physician or 
spouse will not suffice because athletes are responsible for those to whom they allow access to their 
food and drink. Perhaps the most celebrated victim of the nutritional supplement provisions is 
Alberto Contador, whose positive test for Clenbuterol was said by CAS to be most likely due to 
supplement contamination rather than from a blood transfusion or contaminated meat products, or 
as a result of deliberate ingestion by the athlete (UCI v Alberto Contador Velasco CAS 
2011/A/2384). This was despite the fact that clean test certificates had been produced for samples of 
each supplement he acknowledged he had used in an effort to refute any contention that he had been 
at fault in his use of those supplements – in the eyes of the CAS, the fact that the athlete had chosen 
to use a supplement removed any possibility of a finding that there had been no fault at all. 
  
Key Cases: Wallader and Hardy  
While Contador’s experience has commanded infinitely more attention, the experiences of Rachel 
Wallader (UKAD v Wallader 29 October 2010) are more likely to strike a chord with most athletes 
who are likely to fall foul of anti-doping regimes. Wallader, a 21 year-old student, was banned for 
one year in October 2010 after she tested positive for methylhexaneamine (MHA). Her ban was 
reduced on appeal to four months after UKAD accepted that she had taken that substance 
inadvertently in a nutritional supplement – but the publicity given to supplement-related cases since 
that time means it is inconceivable that an athlete would receive such comparatively lenient 
treatment now. She had listed the supplement she was using on her anti-doping form and had fully 
co-operated throughout the disciplinary procedure. The UK Anti-Doping Panel had accepted that 
she had been at fault, but found there had been no significant fault and it was therefore appropriate 
to impose a one-year ban (the minimum which could be imposed under Article 10.5 of the WADA 
Code) rather than the two-year ban which (prior to the 2015 amendments) ordinarily applied in 
respect of non-specified substances such as MHA.  
Wallader had argued that, as a full-time student balancing study, training and travel to 
competitions, she had needed to use supplements to boost her dietary intake; her coach, Geoff 
Capes, had obtained sponsorship from the manufacturers (under which they provided free sachets of 
‘Endure’, one of their supplements, to his athletes). Capes testified that ‘he discussed the 
ingredients with the supplier, which is a responsible and reputable firm, and received a clear 
assurance that they were all legal’ (para 21) and in 2009 Wallader, (who had received a box of six 
sachets) carried out her own checks of the listed contents against the WADA Prohibited List then in 
force (WADA, 2011) and referred to UK Sport’s resources and those of the IAAF. The issue of 
whether the contents were ‘legal’ rather misses the point – the concern was whether the 
supplements accorded with the WADA Code, not with the UK’s drug misuse legislation – and in 
that respect Wallader’s difficulty was that both of the resources she referred to clearly warned of the 
dangers posed by nutritional supplements. Although in its ruling the Panel confirmed that ‘the 
ingredient 1,3-dimethylamylamine, which is listed as an ingredient on the box packaging on 
Endure, is a synonym for MHA’ (UKAD v Wallader, para 30) it also stated that when Wallader 
started to use the supplements 
  
neither 1,3-dimethylamylamine, nor MHA, was listed as a prohibited stimulant under Section 
S6(a) of the WADA Code. These are specified substances in the 2014 Prohibited List (WADA, 
2014), but it would have required some medical knowledge to discover that 1,3-dimethylamylamine 
was a stimulant which would be considered to be a stimulant equivalent to those identified in 
Section S6 … an athlete without medical or scientific expertise would have no such knowledge 
(UKAD v Wallader, para 30). 
  
Hence the initial one-year sanction. 
In her appeal against that sanction, Wallader pointed out that after the Anti-Doping Panel 
made its initial decision the status of MHA changed under the WADA code, with the effect that 
from January 1
st
 2011 MHA became a S6(b) specified stimulant. This means that athletes who 
tested positive after that date were able to invoke Article 10.4 of the Code in respect of those 
substances, and thus seek to provide an explanation as to how the substance had been ingested and 
to persuade the tribunal that there had been no performance-enhancing intent in the hope of 
reducing their sanction to, as a minimum, a reprimand. Wallader argued, and UKAD accepted (at 
para 5), that the principle of lex mitior (which means that if the law is amended subsequent to the 
offence, the less severe provision should be applied and is reflected in Article 25.2 of the WADA 
Code) allowed the athlete to take advantage of a subsequent change in the applicable law which was 
beneficial to her and she was thus able to invoke the Article 10.4 provisions.. On the basis of what 
the Tribunal called her ‘clear and consistent’ testimony and the corroborating evidence, it 
determined that she had not been aware that the supplement had contained MHA and there was no 
intent to enhance performance (‘she cannot have intended that a supplement used to give a short-
term energy boost would enhance her performance in competition two days later’ (para 36)).  
However, the take-home point is that Wallader had indeed ‘intended to enhance’ her 
performance. That certainly does not mean she had intended to cheat, but Simon Emms’ tax case 
clearly shows that one would only use supplements if performance enhancement was one’s 
intention – and athletes certainly do not take anything with the intention of ‘diminishing’ their 
performance. Despite all the steps she had taken to establish  the contents, it was not open to the 
Tribunal to find that Wallader’s was a case of ‘no fault’ (which would have led to her exoneration) 
because by 2010 
  
the dangers of taking supplements (had) been made clear by the anti-doping authorities, 
and athletes who (use them) are running a risk … Any athlete who takes a supplement 
without first taking the advice from a qualified medical practitioner with expertise in 
doping control places herself at real risk of committing a rule violation. Only in the 
most exceptional circumstances could such an athlete expect to escape a substantial 
sanction if a Prohibited Substance is then detected.  
(Paras 46, 47). 
  
In the wake of the West case discussed below, some will argue that consulting a qualified medical 
practitioner who gave unsound advice is not enough to result in a ‘no fault’ finding: if the athlete 
chooses to go to somebody who advised them badly, they leave themselves open to the argument 
that they are still at fault for using them at all. Commenting on the case, Wallader’s lawyer, Walter 
Nicholls, said ‘the advice to be given to athletes needs to be revised and updated to emphasise the 
dangers of taking supplements. The only real solution is not to take them at all’ (BBC, 2010). Sadly, 
it appears some of Geoff Capes’ other athletes were slow to learn the lessons of Wallader’s case; in 
2010 two of them were banned for two years after refusing to submit to random tests (arguing that 
the public toilets at Loughborough University where their samples would have been provided were 
‘too dirty’). Capes himself was stripped of his UK Athletics coaching mentor role, although he was 
not charged with any doping violations (Hart, 2010). 
  
WADA v Hardy 
Wallader’s case bears fleeting comparison with the CAS ruling in Puerta v ITF CAS 2006/A/1025. 
and to a lesser extent with WADA/ITF v Gasquet CAS 2009/A/1926; 2009/A/1930, but a more 
worthwhile comparator lies in the dispute involving the American swimmer Jessica Hardy (WADA 
v Hardy and USADA CAS 2009/A/1870), which also concerns the unforeseen implications of 
nutritional supplement use but perhaps with a greater degree of fault on the part of the athlete than 
had been ascribed to Wallader. Here, a one-year ban was imposed by an American Arbitration 
Association Panel (McArdle, 2014) after Hardy tested positive for clenbuterol at the Olympic Trials 
in July 2008. Hardy had qualified for four events as a result of her performances at the trials, but the 
timing of the ban meant she missed out on participating at Beijing, where the swimming events took 
place just one month after the US Trials. Again, her ban of one year reflected the steps she had 
ostensibly taken to ascertain whether the supplement she was using was compliant with the WADA 
Code. These included contacting AdvoCare, the manufacturers, with whom she had a contractual 
relationship. AdvoCare told her that its products were independently tested (although that only 
applied in respect of one of their products) and their website gave no suggestion that there might be 
anything untoward about the products (which would hardly be surprising, unless a company was 
deliberately seeking to drive itself out of business). There was certainly no indication that their 
products might contain a steroid such as clenbuterol and, for what it was worth, AdvoCare had 
given her an indemnity in respect of its products (WADA v Hardy, para 4).  
The AAA Panel which heard her case decided that ‘None of the CAS cases reviewed by the 
Panel includes the combination of circumstances listed above’ but it went on to say that, in totality, 
these did ‘add up to “truly exceptional” circumstances.’ While this is certainly not the sense in 
which WADA Code expects the phrase ‘truly exceptional’ to be interpreted (it being used in this 
case simply in the sense of a combination of circumstances being ‘unusual’) the AAA Panel was 
again convinced that Hardy had no ‘intention’ to enhance her performance – once more regarding 
‘enhancing’ as synonymous with ‘cheating’. While there had been some element of negligence in 
the mere fact of her deciding to use supplements, notwithstanding the clear warnings from USADA 
and other sources about supplements, it took the view that ‘the issue is whether her conduct is 
below the level of Significant Negligence defined in the FINA doping Control Rules.’ Based on the 
totality of the evidence before it, in August 2008 the AAA Panel handed down an interim award and 
ruled that ‘Hardy’s ineligibility period could be reduced to the maximum possible extent under the 
applicable rules, and (…) an ineligibility period of one year was fair and reasonable (para 4).’  
The difficulty here is that the WADA Code does not speak of ‘significant negligence’ but of 
‘no significant fault’. Hardy benefitted from FINA’s failure to ensure its internal provisions 
mirrored those of the WADA Code. Like Wallader, she was not treated unduly harshly but the 
aftermath of the AAA award was unedifying and reflected badly on the IOC, which sought to 
ensure that she missed out on London 2012, having already missed the Beijing Olympics. This 
resulted in an appeal to the CAS where WADA argued: 
 
The circumstances of Hardy’s case are not truly exceptional and … Hardy’s negligence 
must be considered to be significant. In support of this allegation WADA underlines 
that, even though Hardy was aware of the explicit warnings against the potential 
dangers of food supplements and, as an experienced top-level athlete, she should have 
been particularly vigilant, she had chosen to trust blindly a sponsor that commercialises 
nutritional supplements described as ‘enhancing muscle growth’, even signing an 
Endorsement Agreement; that she had failed to conduct further investigations with a 
doctor or any other reliable specialist, in addition to making direct enquiries with the 
supplement manufacturer; that she could have realised, by a simple search on the 
internet, that the description of the food supplements offered to her were alarming; that 
she did not have the supplements tested; that the indemnity clause contained in the 
Endorsement Agreement indicates that Hardy accepted that her behaviour could be 
risky.  
(Para 35) 
 
Several earlier CAS decisions have turned on the construction of ‘significant’ fault, and while the 
panel did not consider those rulings expressly (CAS’ wilful refusal to consider its own previous 
relevant jurisprudence being a consistent and longstanding limitation of its work that is guaranteed 
to invoke the wrath of lawyers the world over), it did indicate that those decisions offered 
‘guidance’ to it and helped establish the proposition that ‘a period of ineligibility can be reduced 
based on no significant fault or negligence only in cases where the circumstances are truly 
exceptional’ (para 40). On that basis, and doubtless to the chagrin of WADA, the Panel went on to 
say that it ‘agrees with the AAA Panel that the circumstances of Hardy’s case are “truly 
exceptional”’ (para 42). Although it acknowledged that WADA’s argument that she could have 
taken other steps had merit, CAS made reference to the Despres ruling (CAS 2006/A/1025) and 
determined, rather surprisingly, that ‘Hardy has shown good faith efforts to leave no reasonable 
stone unturned’ (WADA v Hardy, para 43). It also made the somewhat disingenuous point that 
AdvoCare’s indemnity ‘rather constitutes a sign of reassurance ... that its products were safe and 
that the information and reassurance given to her by AdvoCare to her were true and reliable’ (para 
44). It was never doubted that AdvoCare thought its products were safe but, again, that is scarcely 
the point. Once the Panel had decided that this was indeed a case of ‘no significant fault’, it was 
then a relatively straightforward matter to reiterate the well-established CAS principle that  
 
the measure of the sanction imposed by a disciplinary body in the exercise of the 
discretion allowed by the relevant rules can be reviewed only when the sanction is 
evidently and grossly disproportionate to the offence ... The Panel ... holds the sanction 
imposed by the AAA to be proportionate to the level of Hardy’s negligence.  
(Paras 48, 49) 
 
A cursory review of the relevant CAS judgments prior to Hardy indicates that the likelihood of 
WADA succeeding in its application to have the full two-year sanction imposed upon Hardy was 
always decidedly slim; one struggles to understand why this course of action was ever embarked 
upon, unless it sensed an opportunity to pull rank over the AAA and exert its authority over US 
Olympic sports that are compelled to adhere to the Code (in contrast to the US professional sports, 
for example, which will not care in the least about WADA’s world view unless their athletes are 
selected for Olympic competition and suddenly find themselves subjected to a radically different 
and far more extensive anti-doping regime (BBC, 2014a)). More nefarious was the fact that the 
sanction WADA sought had no basis in the FINA Rules: in effect, it sought a two-year suspension 
that was split into two separate one-year ‘chunks’ but FINA Rule DC 10.9 provides that any period 
of ineligibility must commence no later than the hearing date (which was 1
st
 August 2008, when the 
AAA Panel handed down its one-year suspension) and there was no scope in the applicable rules for 
WADA’s request for a two-year suspension from the date of the CAS judgment (with the period of 
suspension already served to be ‘credited against the total period of suspension to be served’). This 
simple matter of regulation interpretation, a proper review of how CAS tribunals had previously 
evaluated ‘significant fault’ and the circumstances under which a sanction imposed by a domestic 
tribunal were likely to be overturned were not beyond the wit-and-compass of WADA’s lawyers, 
but their decision to press on with the case reinforces the perception that WADA brought this case 
in an attempt to pull rank over the US anti-doping regime in general. An alternative is that it was so 
concerned by athletes who inadvertently ingest banned substances through nutritional supplements 
that it felt obliged to challenge any sanction it considered unduly lenient in an attempt to further 
publicise this aspect of the anti-doping regime and the consequences of breaking it. Whatever 
interpretation one places on events, it seems clear that US Anti-doping control is on course for 
further collisions with the WADA Code. Athletes from American Colleges (including another 
Nigerian, Muizat Odumosu, a former student at the University of Southern Alabama, who won the 
400m hurdles in Delhi) have successfully participated in world events such as the Commonwealth 
Games and others where doping control is carried out in accordance with the WADA code rather 
than the domestic sports’ alternative versions. North American basketball and ice hockey players 
who participate at the Olympics will also need to accept that they will be subject to doping regimes 
that are radically different to whatever ones might be in place under the collective bargaining 
agreements that regulate such matters at the domestic level; but every case concerning nutritional 
supplements that is heard by either a domestic tribunal or the CAS renders it more difficult for other 
athletes to argue that they were not ‘significantly’ at fault for their own violation. The genie is out 
of the bottle, and unless an athlete can show they were using supplements in order to meet a 
contractual obligation to an employer, as was implicitly the case with Simon Emms, they are clearly 
taking a ‘risk’ with the ‘intent’ of enhancing performance. 
 
Recent developments 
Immediately after Samuel Okon’s positive test for MHA at the 2010 Commonwealth Games, Mike 
Fennell, the head of the Commonwealth Games Federation, expressed concern at the number of 
athletes who were testing positive as a result of supplement use: 
 
At this stage I cannot speak very definitively as to where it’s coming from but it appears 
that it may be coming from the use of supplements. The supplements industry is by and 
large an unregulated industry worldwide and it is an industry that is a cause of great 
concern, not only for the fight against doping but also the protection of athletes. There 
are all sorts of claims as to what is in them and we have found that in many cases the 
claims are inaccurate. So many (athletes) are misled into using these supplements.  
(BBC, 210a) 
  
To characterise it as an ‘unregulated industry worldwide’ is stretching the point – it is unregulated 
in many jurisdictions, but not worldwide – but shortly after, in December 2010, Matt Schenck, an 
American basketball player plying his trade in England, received a three-month ban after testing 
positive for MHA; again, his ban was relatively low because he was able to show that he had 
ingested it inadvertently through a nutritional supplement. UKAD also noted that MHA had not 
been listed as an ingredient in that supplement, and that he had enquired of his coaching staff 
whether the supplement was appropriate for use in out-of-competition training (UKAD v Schneck, 
17 December 2010). Travelling in the wake of Hardy he was decidedly fortunate, but the recent 
cases show how naïve it would be for athletes to expect such comparatively lenient treatment in the 
future. Whatever the merits of WADA’s approach to supplement-derived positive tests and CAS’ 
treatment of them, it is no longer tenable for athletes to argue they did not know what the risks are, 
or that they were not intending to enhance performance.  
This is apparent from CAS’ treatment of the subject in WADA v West and Fédération 
Internationale de Motocyclisme CAS2012/A/3029, a case which all athletes’ legal advisors should 
commit to memory. Here, after a telephone conference, a disciplinary tribunal of the FIM 
sanctioned an Australian motorcycle rider with a one-month suspension after he tested positive for 
MHA, which had been ingested through an over-the-counter nutritional supplement. The tribunal 
accepted he had no intention to enhance his performance and found he had no knowledge that the 
product in question contained MHA. On its appeal to the CAS, WADA sought a full two-year ban 
and argued that the CAS case law, its own website and that of the Australian anti-doping authority 
gave ample warning as to the risks of supplement contamination. While it accepted that the rider 
had never received anti-doping education it emphasised the athlete’s personal responsibility and 
contended that ‘taking a poorly-labelled dietary supplement is not an adequate defence in a doping 
hearing’ (para 25). WADA also pointed out that although MHA was not listed as an ingredient the 
product was clearly labelled as containing ‘geranium oil’, that there was no medical justification for 
his using the supplement and that West accepted he had taken it because he wanted a low-sugar 
stimulant to help him focus on the morning of a race so, by definition, he had taken it with a view to 
enhancing his performance and therefore the benefits of Article 10.4 of the WADA Code (which 
assists an athlete who can show there was no performance-enhancing intent, as outlined above) 
could not be available.  
The CAS Panel noted that there was ‘complexity’ in cases where athletes have challenged the 
imposition of the mandatory two-year ban, arguing that Articles 10.4 or 10.5 should have been used 
in their favour. West had no possibility of establishing ‘no fault’ because he had been careless in the 
steps he took over his supplement choice (not bothering to check online or with a physician, but 
simply asking the store clerk whether it was ‘OK’ even though the product was labelled and 
advertised as promoting muscle growth). That left him with the possibility of establishing either ‘no 
significant fault’ as per Article 10.5, or bringing himself within the scope of Article 10.4 by 
showing there was no intention to improve performance (there being no dispute as to the source of 
the banned substance). In this regard, and as the CAS has finally, definitely explained, the difficulty 
is in the difference between taking something to improve performance and taking something in 
order to cheat. The CAS itself has not been consistent in this regard (see USADA v Oliviera 
CAS2012/A/2645); but even if there is no intention to cheat in terms of breaking the rules or 
behaving in an ‘underhand way’, Article 10.4 cannot be available as a defence if the athlete 
intended to enhance his performance, and ‘intended’ falls to be interpreted very broadly. As the 
Panel said in West, ‘the athlete accepts that he took the supplement in order to give himself a 
“boost” on the morning of his race … it is simply not believable that enhanced alertness and 
concentration do not give a competitive advantage’ (para 55). Article 10.4 was therefore 
unavailable to West, and ‘no significant fault’ under Article 10.4 was similarly unavailable because 
of his reckless attitude to the supplement’s contents and his failure to take proper steps in respect of 
them. ‘He did not consult his manager, the (governing body) doctors, a nutritionist or anyone else’; 
and he did not conduct any internet research or cross-reference the names of substances listed on the 
product with the governing body or WADA list, which ‘likely would have revealed that the 
ingestion of Mesomorph (the supplement in question) involved a substantial risk’ (paras 67, 68). 
His fault was akin to other recent cases of athletes whose attitude to supplements were, at best, 
gung-ho (see for example Kutrovsky v International Tennis Federation CAS 2012/A/2804; WADA v 
IWWF and Rathy CAS 2012/A/2701; WADA v Judo Board Nederland and de Goede CAS 
2012/A/2747). Although the judgment does not state so explicitly, it seems that West only avoided 
the full two-year ban (instead receiving an 18 month sanction) because of the extent of his 
cooperation with the authorities and the fact that his governing body had never provided appropriate 
training and education opportunities. 
 
Tentative conclusions 
The recent cases (especially those heard by the CAS since 2011) serve as irrefutable evidence that, 
regardless of which part of the world a product emanates from, who has manufactured it, what 
domestic legal provisions apply to supplement use or manufacture or what steps an athlete takes (or 
fails to take) to establish its purity, one can never say with certainty that any product is WADA 
compliant, or that what is on the label is what is in the container. If flaws in the manufacturing 
procedure mean that the labelling is silent as to what the supplement really contains, so that an 
athlete can no longer find out if there are prohibited substances by cross-referring it to WADA’s 
own database or by seeking medical advice, it becomes very difficult to argue that the supplement 
was the true source of the violation – the burden is on the athlete to prove that it was, to the 
comfortable satisfaction of the panel. Contador shows it is impossible for an athlete to establish the 
source of the failed test unless the labelling indicates that was the source, or unless there is clear 
evidence of contamination at the manufacturing stage, and West shows that even if the athlete can 
pinpoint the source by such means, it is then impossible to show they were not at fault for the 
infringement which followed; either they failed to understand what the ingredients were, or they 
took a risk by ingesting the supplement in the first place.  
In some jurisdictions anti-doping authorities and other interested parties maintain databases 
which detail ostensibly ‘low-risk’ supplements, manufactured by companies that perform rigorous 
quality controls or which are able to guarantee that there is no contact with steroids or other 
prohibited substances during the production of their nutritional supplements, and these are very 
worthwhile sources of information (see for example http://antidoping.nl/nzvt (Netherlands); 
www.koelnerliste.de (Germany); www.informed-sport.com (US and UK)). But these cases show 
that just because nothing remiss has occurred in the production process before, that is no guarantee 
that problems will not arise in the future. Those websites might have a role to play, but international 
and domestic governing bodies’ anti-doping advice is increasingly to the effect that those who may 
be subjected to testing should not use nutritional supplements, or at the very least tread exceedingly 
cautiously in the face of manufacturers’ claims, and that advice should be heeded by all athletes 
who may be amenable to testing as well as by legal advisors as well as by coaches and other support 
staff (who, let us not forget, can also be sanctioned under the Code). It is increasingly unlikely that 
any athlete who fails a test on the basis of nutritional supplement use will be able to argue ‘no 
fault’, and in the current climate even a successful argument of ‘no significant fault’ is still likely to 
attract a ban in excess of a year. Both Wallader and Hardy missed out on the opportunity to 
compete at major global events because they chose to use nutritional supplements, and for the better 
part of two years Hardy was placed in a state of limbo so far as her participation at London 2012 
was concerned. The more cases that arise and the more publicity the issue receives through 
governing bodies, media reports and athlete education, the more difficult it will become to argue 
that there had been ‘no significant fault’ in any other circumstance. The recent CAS jurisprudence 
reflects that state of affairs (see for example Qerimaj v International Weightlifting Federation CAS 
2012/A/2822). Athletes would do well to avoid all supplement use and players’ unions should be 
willing to argue very forcefully against employment contracts that either explicitly or implicitly 
pressurise athletes into using them. 
Finally, the 2015 changes to the WADA code will not necessarily provide succour. The new Article 
10.2.3 provides that: 
 
… the term ‘intentional’ means that the athlete or other person engaged in conduct 
which he or she knew constituted an anti-doping rule violation, or knew that there was a 
significant risk that the conduct might constitute an anti-doping rule violation and 
disregarded that risk.  
 
While there will inevitably be difficulties in determining what constitutes a ‘significant risk’ as 
opposed to a ‘risk’ or a ‘slight risk’, for the purpose of positive tests through supplement use there 
is now an even clearer potential for CAS and anti-doping tribunals to decide that any use of a 
nutritional supplement inevitably carries with it a ‘significant risk’, and that by using them the 
athlete has indeed disregarded the risks associated with them. Such an approach would be consistent 
with West and the lessons to be learned from other recent CAS decisions, and it would avoid the 
need to decide whether a given supplement falls into the ‘significantly risky’, ‘decidedly risky’ or 
‘just a little bit risky’ category. WADA has also said, à propos the 2015 amendments, that ‘the 
ultimate objective of the fight against doping in sports is to protect clean athletes’ and parties should 
seek to ensure this by ‘intensifying the fight’ (to quote the Johannesburg Declaration) – which 
sounds all very well, until one appreciates that being a ‘clean’ athlete is a physical state as well as a 
mental one; it is not simply the antithesis of ‘cheating’. Unless and until there is evidence of a 
contrary approach to ‘risk’ being adopted by the CAS the message has to be, once again, that 
athletes who are likely to be tested should avoid supplements altogether, should they wish to avoid 
the possibility of being caught in the trap of ‘modified’ strict liability. The only possible exception 
is where their use is an express term of an employment contract – an implicit expectation that the 
athlete will use them, as occurred in Emms, might not be enough. If the use of a supplement is 
directed by a team physician or other person in a position of supervisory authority over the player, 
the employment contract should say as much. Contracts containing such terms should also include 
an express term that the player will not face disciplinary action and potential loss of wages or 
dismissal in the event of their adhering to that contractual term and subsequently being sanctioned 
under the WADA Code, and the players themselves should obtain a written undertaking to that 
effect every time the team physician provides, or every time they purchase themselves, a new 
supplement batch. The possibility of being required to pay a player who is unable to train, let alone 
play, for a period of months or even years should be enough to focus the collective mind, and this is 
an issue that players’ representatives should explore forcibly with employers – whether through 
direct union activity (in the case of the Australian Football League), via social dialogue (in all 
sports at the European Union level) or through other structures such as collective bargaining 
negotiations in North American professional sports. The latter currently provides the best examples 
of situations where athletes are genuinely ‘consulted’ and cooperated with, rather than simply being 
told what is going to happen, and athletes’ unions with experience of the matter would be only too 
pleased to offer guidance and support to others. 
 
References 
Alcolizer (2014) ‘The Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics Has Had the Most Positive Drug Tests of Any 
Olympic Games’ http://alcolizer.com/sochi-olympics-the-most-positive-drug-tests-of-any-
olympic-games (accessed 9 May 2014). 
Anderson, J. [2014] ‘Doping, sport and the Law: Time for Repeal of Prohibition? International 
Journal of Law in Context, 9:2, 135-159. 
Ansell v Brown [2001] WL 535716. 
BBC (2011) ‘Unnamed Australians Test Positive for Banned Substance’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/frontpage/9120842.stm (accessed 20 February 2014). 
BBC (2010) ‘Appeals Panel Partially Clears Capes-Trained Wallader’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/9161219.stm (accessed 23 June 2014). 
BBC (2010a) Second Nigerian Tests Positive at Commonwealth Games’, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/commonwealth_games/delhi_2010/9082481.stm (accessed 20 
February 2011). 
BBC (2014) ‘Evi Sachenbacher-Stehle and William Frullani Sent Home’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/winter-olympics/26289156 (accessed 21 March 2014). 
BBC (2014a) ‘Sochi 2014: Nicklas Backstrom and Johannes Duerr Test Positive’, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/winter-olympics/26312069 (accessed 20 March 2014). 
Charlish, P. (2012) ‘Drugs in Sport’ Legal Information Management, 12:2, 109-120. 
Emms v HMRC [2008] WL 371110. 
Geyer, H., Paevis, M., Koehler, K., Mareck, U., Schanzer, W., Thevis, M. (2008) ‘Nutritional 
Supplements Cross-Contaminated and Faked with Doping Substances’ Journal of Mass 
Spectrometry, 43:7, 892-902. 
Geyer H., Parr, M., Mareck, U., Reinhart, U., Schrader, Y., Schaenzer, W.  (2004) ‘Analysis of 
Non-Hormonal Nutritional Supplements for Anabolic-Androgenic Steroids’ International 
Journal of Sports Medicine, 25:2, 124-129. 
Green, G., Gatlin, D., Starcevic, B., (2001) ‘Analysis of Over-the-Counter Dietary Supplements’ 11 
Clinical Journal of Sport Medicine, 11:4, 254-258. 
Hart, S. (2010) ‘Shot Putters Coached by Geoff Capes Banned’ Telegraph 19 July 2010, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/othersports/athletics/7899157/Shot-putters-coached-by-
Geoff-Capes-banned-for-refusing-drug-test.html (accessed 20 March 2014). 
Johannesburg Declaration on Doping, http://wada2013.org/documents/WADA-WCDS-2013-Jburg-
Declaration.FINAL.pdf (accessed 19 March 2014). 
Kohler, R. and Lambert, M. (2002) ‘Urine Nandrolone Metabolites: False Positive Doping Tests?’ 
36 British Journal of Sports Medicine 325-329.  
Korda v ITF The Times 4 February 1999. 
Kutrovsky v International Tennis Federation CAS 2012/A/2804. 
McArdle, D. (2014) Dispute Resolution in Sport: Athletes, Law and Arbitration London: Taylor and 
Francis. 
Meca-Medina v Commission [2006] 5 CMLR 18. 
Puerta v ITF CAS 2006/A/1025. 
Qerimaj v International Weightlifting Federation CAS 2012/A/2822. 
UCI v Alberto Contador Velasco CAS 2011/A/2384. 
UKAD v Schenck 17 December 2010. 
UKAD v Wallader 29 October 2010. 
USADA v Oliviera CAS2 012/A/2645. 
USA Shooting and Quigley v Union Internationale de Tir CAS 94/129. 
Van der Merwe, P. and Grobbelaar, E. (2005) ‘Unintentional Doping Through the Use of 
Contaminated Nutritional Supplements’ 95:7 South African Medical Journal 510-512. 
WADA/ITF v Gasquet CAS 2009/A/1926; 2009/A/1930. 
WADA v Hardy and USADA CAS 2009/A/1870. 
WADA v IWWF and Rathy CAS 2012/A/2701. 
WADA v Judo Board Nederland and de Goede CAS 2012/A/2747. 
WADA v West and Fédération Internationale de Motocyclisme CAS 2012/A/3029. 
WADA (2009) ‘WADA Code, 2009 Revision, Article 10.4’, available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/Documents/World_Anti-Doping_Program/WADP-The-Code/WADA_Anti-
Doping_CODE_2009_EN.pdf (accessed 1 February 2014). 
WADA (2011) ‘WADA 2011 Prohibited List’ previously available at http://www.wada-
ama.org/en/World-Anti-Doping-Program/Sports-and-Anti-Doping-
Organizations/International-Standards/Prohibited-List/The-2011-Prohibited-List (accessed 21 
February 2011). 
WADA (2014) ‘Specified Stimulants’ http://list.wada-ama.org/list/s6-stimulants (accessed 20 
March 2014). 
Warner, M. (2014) ‘Essendon Launches Federal Court Challenge Against ASADA and AFL, 
Herald Sun 13 June 2014 http://www.heraldsun.com.au/sport/afl/essendon-launches-federal-
court-challenge-against-asada-and-afl/story-fni5f22o-
1226952296676?nk=0a83aead01b491f13a33b3c2093bba7b (accessed 25 June 2014) 
Young, A. (2014) ‘Tests Find Risky Stimulants in Supplements’ USA Today 9 May 2014 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/05/09/tests-find-synthetic-stimulants-
iforce-nutrition-dexaprine-xr/8905197/ (accessed 23 June 2014). 
 
